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NOTES
THE ADA'S LAST STAND?: STANDING AND
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Elizabeth Keadle Markey*
One who is sincerely interested in human communication and
cooperation, in being genuinely helpful, will pay only so much
attention to the disability as is necessary to give the other the help he
needs and wants, will not call undue attention to it by extravagant
gestures of sympathy and elaborate offers of undesired help, will give
such help as is asked for or indicated in a matter-of-course way,
neither evading nor emphasizing the fact of the disability, and will in
general keep his companionship with the other on a basis that will
keep communication and companionship between the handicapped
and the unhandicappedas nearly normal as possible.'
INTRODUCTION
(No Pain,No Standing)

A wheelchair-bound woman is suffering from a painful cavity.' She
makes an appointment with a newly-arrived but reputable dentist in
her small home town, only to find that the dentist's office and parking
lot are not wheelchair accessible. No one from the office offers her
any help, and she cannot enter the office to see the dentist.
Frustrated, she seeks legal advice.
At her meeting with a lawyer (in a wheelchair-accessible office), the
woman learns that she may have a cause of action under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 3 But the lawyer, having researched
the relevant case law, offers some words of warning: "If you really
. J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Marc Arkin for her guidance and mentoring; my parents, Beverly and
Thomas Keadle, and my husband, James Markey, for their constant support; and Jake
for his demonstration of how to live a full and joyful life with a disability.
1. Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt's Book of Common Sense Etiquette
459 (1962).
2. This hypothetical is loosely based on Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628-30

(1998).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
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want to take this case all the way, you're going to have to live with
some pain. Whatever you do, don't get that cavity filled until the case
has gone through trial and all possible appeals. And if you even think
of seeing another dentist, don't tell anyone. If you do, your case could
get dismissed for lack of standing."
A blind man in the same town has just completed his training with
his first-ever seeing-eye dog. Eager to exercise this new-found
independence, but wary of walking around town alone, he instead
asks a friend to drive him to another town, about 75 miles away, for a
day of shopping and dining out. Things go along smoothly, until the
man attempts to take his dog into a restaurant for dinner. The
restaurant's host, angrily refuses to seat the two friends, and gives
them the choice of either leaving or tying the dog to the bike stand
outside. When the manager comes to the scene, she supports the
host's refusal. The blind man and his friend eat dinner elsewhere.
The blind man sues the restaurant under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and discovery begins. At his deposition, the blind
man states that he does not wish to return to the restaurant whose
employees treated him so rudely. In fact, by the time of trial two
years later, the man has not even visited the town in which the
restaurant is located. The restaurant, however, sticks to its "no dogs
allowed" policy. At trial, the judge dismisses the case for lack of
standing. "Plaintiff can't seek injunctive relief," the judge says,
"because he has shown no intent to return to the restaurant and
therefore he can't say that the restaurant is causing him harm now, or
that it poses a threat of imminent future harm."4
These hypotheticals illustrate the legal barriers that many courts
have constructed for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief under Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").5 Many courts have
relied on tenuous analogies to, and narrow interpretations of,
judicially-created standing doctrine in deciding whether a plaintiff has
standing under the ADA.6 Granted, the ADA's remedial scheme
does not expressly grant standing to private plaintiffs, but current
standing jurisprudence leaves the issue of standing under the ADA
open to interpretation. This Note advocates greater vigilance on the
part of the courts to ensure that persons who suffer disability
discrimination do have standing to bring their claims, and greater
emphasis on the ADA as a civil rights statute to advance Congress's
4. This hypothetical statement is similar to the court's holding in DeLil v. El
Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94-3900, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788, at *11-14 (N.D. Cal.
June 23, 1997), in which a wheelchair-bound plaintiff did not have standing under the
ADA because she did not face a "real and immediate threat of future harm."
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181-12,189 (1994) (Title III of the ADA); see also infra notes
13-25 and accompanying text; see generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 97 Civ. 7034, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4915 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va.
1995).
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goal in creating the ADA-the elimination of disability
discrimination.
Part I of this Note outlines the background and history of the ADA.
The bipartisan political support that the statute has enjoyed since its
enactment lends credibility to the congressional findings that the
ADA was, and is, much-needed legislation. Part I then discusses
Congress's broad grant of standing to ADA plaintiffs and the
apparent strength that the ADA gains through that grant. This part
concludes with an overview of traditional standing doctrine and
focuses on the two cases that courts most often invoke in applying
standing doctrine to the ADA.
Part II explores the application of standing doctrine to Title III of
the ADA. This part surveys the district court cases in which courts
have invoked traditional standing doctrine to find that plaintiffs
lacked standing to suie.
Part III begins with a discussion of the arguments for either a
restrictive or a liberal view of standing that underlie the courts'
decisions. It suggests a "workable standard" for standing that gives
the ADA "teeth" as a civil rights law.

I. THE ADA: THE FIRST TWELVE YEARS
Jubilant rhetoric accompanied the enactment of the ADA, but
bitter reality followed soon thereafter. This part begins with a brief
examination of the bipartisan support that led to the passage of the
ADA, and discusses the provisions of Title III. Part I then outlines
the remedial scheme that Congress enacted.
A. The Promiseof the ADA
Signed into law on July 26, 1990, the ADA was hailed as "the most
sweeping anti-discrimination measure since the Civil Rights Act of
1964."1 At a bill-signing ceremony with an audience of some twothousand individuals with disabilities,8 President George H. Bush
compared the Act to the fall of the Berlin Wall, opening "'a onceclosed door to a bright new era."' 9 Ten years later, the pride felt at
the signing of the ADA still resounded in speeches by political
leaders. On the tenth anniversary of the signing of the ADA,
7. A Law for Every American, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1990, at A26.

For a

discussion of the similarities and differences between the ADA and the Civil Rights
Act, see Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 377, 377-80, 385-90, 394-95 (2000). For a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of modeling the ADA upon civil rights statutes, see Matthew Diller,
JudicialBacklash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab.
L. 19, 31-47 (2000).
8. Don Shannon, Spirits Soar as Disabled Rights Become the Law, L.A. Times,
July 27, 1990, at Al.
9. A Law for Every American, supra note 7.
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President William Clinton remarked that the ADA had "liberated...
Americans with disabilities ....We are all a freer, better country
because of the ADA ....
,10The following year President George W.

Bush expressed pride that his father had supported the Act, and called
the legislation "an unprecedented step forward in promoting freedom,
independence, and dignity for millions of our people."" He declared
that he "remain[ed] committed to tearing down the remaining
barriers
12
to equality that face Americans with disabilities today.'
One purpose of the ADA, as stated in the statute itself, is "to

provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 3
Congress's findings showed that America's 43 million persons with

disabilities have been, and continue to be, subjected to exclusion and
segregation; social, educational, and economic disadvantages; and
prejudice based on stereotypical assumptions. 4 This prejudice,
Congress found, denies disabled persons "those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous.""
Title III of the ADA evidences a promise of sweeping change in the
context of access to places of public accommodation:

10. President William J.Clinton, Remarks on the Anniversary of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (July 26, 2000), in Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, July 31, 2000, at 1684, 1686.
11. President George W. Bush, Statement on the Anniversary of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 2001), in Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, July 30, 2001, at 1106, 1107.
12. Id.
13. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1).
14. See id. § 12,101(a).
15. Id. § 12,101(a)(9). While support for the rights of individuals with disabilities
may be a political "no-brainer," the ADA has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Roger
Clegg, The Costly Compassion of the ADA, Pub. Int., Summer 1999, at 100, 104
("Congress felt so sorry for the disabled that it was willing to force other people to
help them, at considerable expense."); Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2000) (analyzing resistance to the ADA as evidenced
by judicial decisions, academic and social commentary, and the media). Furthermore,
although a divided Supreme Court appeared at first to endorse the broad sweep of
Title III of the ADA, see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (finding in favor of
an HIV-positive plaintiff who had sued a dentist for refusing to fill plaintiff's cavity in
his office, not addressing standing), the Court has narrowed the scope of Title I (the
employment provisions) of the ADA in three recent cases: Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suits under the ADA for money
damages against a state employer who would not accommodate employees'
disabilities), Toyota v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691 (2002) (holding that, to qualify for
ADA protection in the employment context, "an individual must have an impairment
that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives"), and US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122
S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (holding that, in most cases, workplace seniority rules will trump
the ADA).
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(a) General Rule. No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
leases (or
place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
16
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
Public accommodations-including hotels, restaurants, movie
theaters, retail stores of many types, service establishments ranging
from laundromats, hospitals, and lawyers' offices to museums, zoos,
schools, day care centers, health spas, bowling alleys, and many
others" 7-that fail to make "reasonable modifications" (unless those
modifications would "fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,
services,.., or accommodations") have violated the ADA."
Title III of the ADA stands out among civil rights statutes because
of the broad scope of covered entities.1 This broad scope, however,
came at a price, as ADA proponents settled for limited remedies in
exchange for extensive coverage of public accommodations.2" The
model for the remedial provisions of Title III was the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("CRA"), which provided only injunctive relief for private
individuals.21 In fact, the text of the ADA refers to the enforcement
provisions of the CRA and does not otherwise describe the type of
relief available for private plaintiffs.22 However, the language of Title
III does make clear whom the statute protects: Injunctive relief is
available "to any person who is being subjected to discrimination,"
and "[n]othing ... shall require a person with a disability to engage in a
futile gesture if such person has actual notice that [an entity] ... does
not intend to comply with [Title III]. " 23
In addition, Title III of the ADA provides an avenue of relief
through the United States Attorney General. This provision allows
the Attorney General to bring suit against an entity if the Attorney
General has reasonable cause to believe that "(i) any person or group
of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination under
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a). For a general discussion of Title III of the ADA, see
Paul V. Sullivan, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Analysis of
Title III and Applicable Case Law, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1117 (1995).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12,181(7). Title III also deals with public transportation services
provided by private organizations. Id. § 12,184(a).
18. Id. §§ 12,182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12,184(b)(2)(A).
19. In fact, previous civil rights statutes-particularly the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("CRA") -covered only a few types of public accommodations. See Colker, supra
note 7, at 378-79.
20. Id. at 378.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1994). Title III of the ADA, therefore, allows only
injunctive relief for private plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1); see Colker, supra note
7, at 378 (discussing the history of the ADA and comparing the ADA to the CRA).
22. The ADA, at 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1), refers to the CRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a3(a), in its delineation of the relief available to a private plaintiff.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Civil Rights Act, in turn, calls
for "preventive relief, including an ... injunction." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (emphasis
added).
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this [title]; or (ii) any person or group of persons has been
discriminated against.., and such discrimination raises an issue of
general public importance." 4 Under the Attorney General provision,
a court may award monetary damages (but not punitive damages) and
may assess a civil penalty of up to $50,000 for the first violation.
Monetary remedies, therefore, are available only to ADA plaintiffs
whose cases attract the attention of the Attorney General.
B. Standing: The ADA 's Strength?
The remedial provisions of the ADA, coupled with Congress's
statements of purpose-"to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities" and "to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority ... to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-

to-day by people with disabilities"Z 6-depict a commitment to
eradicating disability discrimination and utilizing the means necessary
to achieve that end. Such compelling language would seem to indicate
congressional intent to grant standing broadly to persons who suffer
discrimination. Surely Congress wanted ADA plaintiffs to have a
real-as opposed to theoretical-remedy for the violation of their
rights, and surely Congress intended those remedies to provide public
accommodations with the proper incentives to comply with the
statute. Ironically, though, Title III plaintiffs have faced more than
physical barriers in bringing their claims: through narrow
interpretation of the doctrine of standing, many district courts have
"denied access" to the courtroom door. Despite the plain language
and apparent intent of the ADA, standing is one area where the
courts have a chance to limit significantly the relief that Title III of the
ADA offers. This section, therefore, considers general standing
doctrine and its effects in the ADA context.
1. Standing: Some General Concepts
The doctrine of standing answers the questions who may invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and what is required to do so.27
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(b)(1)(B).
25. Id. § 12,188(b)(2), (b)(4).
26. Id. § 12,101(b)(2), (b)(4) (emphasis added).
27. See Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability,Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1984). Standing has
also been defined as "[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial
enforcement of a duty or right," Black's Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed. 1999), or as
answering the question "whether [a] claim may be asserted by the particular party
before the court," Ronald A. Cass et al., Administrative Law 318 (3d ed. 1998).
Fallon remarks "it long since has become commonplace to begin any discussion of the
doctrine of standing by decrying the confusion which persists in this area of the law."

2002]

THE ADA AND STANDING

Standing limitations come from three sources: the language of Article
III that limits the power of the federal courts to "cases and

controversies," judge-made "'prudential' principles," and legislative
enactments.28 Because standing is a limitation on judicial power, a
federal court may inquire into standing at any stage of a suit and, if it
finds the plaintiff lacks standing, dismiss the case.29
The text of Article III of the Constitution provides the foundation
for, but does not mandate, standing doctrine. Article III does not
explicitly refer to "standing," but does limit the power of federal

courts to "Cases" and "Controversies."3 Standing doctrine simply did
not exist in the eighteenth century, and doctrines approximating
standing did not emerge until the 1920s and 1930s.3'

In fact, the

Supreme Court only began to refer to "standing" as an Article III
limitation in 1944,32 and the "explosion of judicial interest" in the
doctrine did not occur until 1970. 3 However, "there had always been

a question whether the plaintiff had a cause of action, and this was
indeed a matter having constitutional status. Without a cause of
3' 4
action, there was no case or controversy and hence no standing.

The focus of what is now the standing issue was, rather, who had a
right to sue, a right that Congress or any other source of law could
grant.35 Without such a grant, a plaintiff had no case or controversy; a

federal court could not hear the plaintiff's claim because the claim did
not satisfy the requirements of Article 111.36
Fallon, supra, at 15 (internal quotation omitted). For a general overview of the
doctrine of standing, see Cass, supra,at 318-72.
28. See Cass, supra note 27, at 318-19. However, "the relation of the differing
principles derived from each limitation are [not entirely] clear." Id. at 319. The
implications of the overlap between the sources may lead to significant separation of
powers issues, for if Congress may legislatively grant standing outside of Article III
requirements, the power of Article III may be diminished. Id. at 319-20. Because of
the provision of ADA's Title III, this Note focuses on standing through legislative
enactment and the role of Article III in limiting (or not limiting) such legislative
enactments.
29. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 15.
30. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases. .. arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;... to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States .. "); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 168 (1992) (noting that
"Article III contains no explicit constitutional requirement of 'standing"').
31. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 170, 179.
32. Id. at 169 & n.23 (referring to Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 170. A cause of action encompassed such actions as the qui tam, which
allowed citizens to "bring civil suits to help in the enforcement of the federal criminal
law," id. at 175, and thus was not necessarily limited to actions against the
government.
35. See id. at 170.
36. Id. at 170-71.
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Standing doctrine began to emerge in its own right in the early
twentieth century, when intense debate surrounded the issue of "the
constitutional legitimacy of the emerging regulatory state."37 Indeed,
standing doctrine in its twentieth-century sense has been almost
entirely devoted to the area of administrative law.38 The "early
architects" of the doctrine-Justices Brandeis and Frankfurtersought to "insulate" New Deal legislation and administrative action
from "frequent judicial attack," especially in cases where "citizens at
large [attempted] to invoke the Constitution to invalidate democratic
outcomes."39 The Court used the doctrine we now call standing to

hold that the plaintiffs in these cases lacked a "personal stake" and
thus could not invoke federal judicial power.4" The Supreme Court
clung to the notion that one had a right to sue (i.e., standing) only if
some source of law had conferred such a right, and these plaintiffs
could not point to such a source of law."
Common law or statutory interests remained the shibboleths for
standing doctrine after the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act:42 "standing [existed] for people whose common law or

statutory interests were at stake, as well as for people expressly
authorized to bring suit under statutes other than the APA."43 Not
until 1970 did a significant "conceptual break" occur in the law of
standing."

In Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,45 the

Court abandoned the notions of "legal interest" or "legal injury,"4 6 by
which a plaintiff needed to show that common law or statutory
interests were at stake to establish standing.47 Instead, the Court
created the "injury-in-fact" test, theoretically a simplification, by
which factual harm, rather than legal injury, would satisfy standing
requirements. 48 The injury-in-fact test has become an important part
37. Id. at 179.
38. See id. at 170-97; Cass, supra note 27, at 318 ("Who may obtain review of
agency action generally is referred to as a question of 'standing."' (emphasis added)).

39. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 179-80 & nn.83-84 (collecting cases).
40. Id. at 180.
41. Id. The Court rejected the constitutional claims in these cases because the
constitutional provisions at issue did not create private rights, but rather created
duties that run to the public at large. Id.; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 573-74 (1992) (noting that generalized grievances do not give rise to a case or

controversy).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000).
Sunstein, supra note 30, at 182.
Id. at 185.
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Sunstein, supra note 30, at 185.
Id. at 181-82, 185.
Id. at 185, 188. Sunstein notes, "One might well ask: What was the source of

the injury-in-fact test? Did the Supreme Court just make it up? The answer is
basically yes." Id. at 185. A complete discussion of the criticisms of the injury-in-fact
test is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is important to highlight Professor
Sunstein's suggestion that an "injury [solely] in fact" is impossible, because it

"inevitably rel[ies] on some standard that is normatively laden and independent of
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of the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence, and it plays a
significant role in ADA decisions. The following sub-sections discuss
the two Supreme Court decisions that have had the most influence on
courts deciding ADA Title III cases, both of which revolve around the
injury-in-fact test.
2.a. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons49

Courts deciding whether a plaintiff has standing under Title III of
the ADA often rely on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, which involved
the choking of an African-American man to unconsciousness by Los
Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") officers who had pulled him
over because of a burned-out tail light.5" In eight years, sixteen people
had died from the use of a chokehold by LAPD officers.5 The Court,
in a five-to-four decision,52 dismissed Lyons's constitutional claims53
for an injunction banning the use of chokeholds on standing grounds.54
Relying on prior cases that refused to grant standing where plaintiffs
alleged only "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct... [without] any
continuing, present adverse effects,"55 the Court, speaking through
Justice White, determined that Lyons had not established a threat of
being stopped again, or of being choked by LAPD officers if he were
stopped.56 Moreover, Lyons' allegation that the City allowed police
chokeholds when deadly force was not threatened by the perpetrator
failed to satisfy the requirements of standing, because, for example,
chokeholds that were allowed to thwart escape would be a threat to
Lyons only in the event that Lyons would have an encounter with an
officer and would attempt to escape.57

facts." Id. at 188-89; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public
Law Litigation, 42 Duke L.J. 1141, 1157, 1160 (1993) ("Creating legal interests, in
fact, is what Congress does for a living. When those interests, having been brought
into existence, are threatened or transgressed, the conclusion that the interest-holder
has been injured is unavoidable.").
49. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). For an extensive discussion of Lyons and its implications
for the doctrine of standing, see Fallon, supra note 27.
50. Lyons, 416 U.S. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

51. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Before the court decided the case, the
LAPD prohibited one of the two types of chokeholds at issue and imposed a
moratorium on the other chokehold. Id. at 99-100.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Lyons alleged impairment of First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. at 98.
54. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, joined by three other
justices, dissented. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)). Commentators
have questioned the applicability of O'Shea to the facts in Lyons. See Fallon, supra
note 27, at 38-39.
56. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
57. Id. at 106.
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In its discussion, the Court conceded that "past wrongs" might
demonstrate "a real and immediate threat of repeated injury."58 The
threat of future injury as a result of future criminal conduct was the
problematic issue for the Court: the anticipation of future criminal
violations did not create an adequate basis for standing. 9 The Court
"assumed that [plaintiffs] will conduct their activities within the law
and so avoid ... exposure to the challenged course of conduct."' In
some ways, this holding makes perfect sense. One cannot overlook
the absurdity involved in a plaintiff's alleging his own future criminal
activity in order to establish standing.6' In other ways, this holding
makes no sense at all, because, following its logic, no plaintiff, whether
law-abiding or not, can seek to enjoin harmful activity on the part of
the police force.62
Federalism issues form an interesting coda to the Lyons opinion.
The "proper balance between state and federal authority" made the
Court reluctant to enjoin state law enforcement practices "in the
absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate."63
Instead, the Court stated that "principles of equity, comity, and
federalism" should control, and that federal courts should account for
the delicate balance "between federal equitable power and State
administration of its own law."' The Court was not concerned about
deterrence of police misconduct, because Lyons could seek remedies
for damages under other federal statutes which the Court recognized
as adequate deterrents to future wrongdoing.65
2.b. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife66
Lujan is perhaps the Court's most significant standing decision in

recent years.67 In this case against the Secretary of the Interior under

the Endangered Species Act,68 the Court, per Justice Scalia,
emphasized the requirement of an "'injury in fact'-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) 'actual or imminent,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical"' -as an
58. Id. at 102 (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496).
59. See id., 461 U.S. at 103.
60. Id. (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 497).
61. The Court appears to have been sensitive to this view. See id.
62. See id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Since no one can show that he will be
choked in the future, no one... has standing to challenge the continuation of the
policy.").
63. Id. at 112.
64. Id. (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)).
65. Id. at 112-13.
66. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
67. For articles to this effect, see Sunstein, supra note 30; Nichol, supra note 48;
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed
Limit on Legislative Power, 42 Duke L.J. 1170 (1993); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III
Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L.J. 1219 (1993).
68. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58.
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"irreducible constitutional minimum of standing."69 The Court also
enunciated two additional elements in a three-part test to guarantee
that a case or controversy exists: a plaintiff must also show that a
causal connection exists between the injury and defendant's conduct,
and that the injury may be redressed by the court's action.' In an
attempt to satisfy the injury-in-fact portion of the test, the plaintiff
organization submitted affidavits of its members who had observed
the habitats of particular endangered species overseas before the
commencement of the government projects at issue and who hoped to
do so again in the future.7' However, would-be plaintiffs' assertion of
a desire to visit areas that might be harmed by government action was
not enough to satisfy the Court: "[s]uch 'some day' intentionswithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any
specification of when the some day will be-do not support a finding

of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require."72
However, the Lujan Court refused to backtrack on previous
Supreme Court opinions that had determined that "the... injury
required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' 73 In the same

paragraph, the Court indicated that Congress may "elevat[e] to the
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that
were previously inadequate in law."74
The opinion in Lujan,
therefore, does not foreclose the possibility of standing pursuant to a

statutory grant.
The Lujan opinion is particularly applicable to suits against the
government. The opinion contains several explicit references to the
standing requirements for plaintiffs who challenge government action,
as opposed to plaintiffs who sue private actors. 75

The Court also

69. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 560-61. This Note focuses on the first element. See infra note 83.
Insofar as the Lujan test for standing ensures that a plaintiff has suffered an actual
injury that the court has the power to remedy, the test answers the purposes of
standing doctrine. See Roberts, supra note 67, at 1220-21. In this sense, standing
serves as a means of judicial self-restraint. Id. However, not all commentators accept
the injury-in-fact test as an appropriate method for determining the existence of
standing. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 188-91; Nichol, supra note 48, at 1154-59.
71. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64.
72. Id. at 564. But see Pierce, supra note 67, at 1177 (discussing the triviality of this
holding). Furthermore, the Court analogized the affiants' past travel to the injuries in
Lyons, as both were examples of "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct." Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 564; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 561-62 ("When the suit is one challenging the legality of government
action... standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an
object of the action. .. at issue." (emphasis added)); id. at 573-74 ("We have
consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government.., does not state an Article III case or controversy." (emphasis added));
id. at 578 ("[I]t is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete
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contrasts two different types of plaintiffs in the Lujan opinion -those
who are objects of government action and those whose injury "arises
from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation.., of someone
else. '76 As the Court described the plight of plaintiffs in the second
category: "[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded,
but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish."" In
deciding this case brought against the Secretary of the Interior,78 the
Court did not discuss the threshold for standing in suits against private
parties.
The Lujan Court also pointed to separation of powers as a rationale
for its standing jurisprudence. According to Justice Scalia, had the
Court ignored the injury-in-fact requirement, it would have
"discard[ed] a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct
constitutional role of the Third Branch,"79 and enabled Congress to
permit the courts to monitor executive action.8° The injury-in-fact
requirement serves to protect the executive power from
encroachment by the courts:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional
duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
81
executed.",

Thus, by limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction to those cases in
which the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, the Lujan Court
attempts to preserve the separation of powers that is a fundamental
part of the federal system.
The restrictive standing doctrine enunciated in Lyons and Lujan
has had a significant impact on standing jurisprudence in general and
on ADA cases in particular. Together, these two cases form the
backbone of the standing analysis in cases brought under Title III of
the ADA. The Lyons requirement of a "real and immediate threat" 2
informs courts' decisions regarding whether a plaintiff has established
an "injury in fact"-that is, whether a plaintiff has satisfied the first
element of the Lujan test. 83 The cases in the next section exemplify
injury requirement must remain." (emphasis added)).
76. Id. at 562 (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).
78. Id. at 559.
79. Id. at 576.
80. Id. at 577.
81. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).
82. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
83. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Nearly every court that has considered Lyons and
Lujan in the ADA context has found no "real or immediate threat." See, e.g., Deck v.
Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298-99 (D. Haw. 2000) (holding that
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the courts' treatment of Lujan, Lyons, and general standing doctrine
in the ADA context.
II. STANDING UP To STANDING: STANDING IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE ADA
Compared to the other titles of the ADA, Title III has received

very little attention from the courts.8" And, admittedly, many courts
deciding Title III claims do not even address standing in their
decisions. 5 When courts do consider standing, though, an ADA
plaintiff's chances of prevailing dwindle to almost zero,86 regardless of
whether the defendants engaged in discrimination once, a few times,
or several times. Instead, the determinative issue in these cases is
whether the plaintiff intended to return to the establishment that

performed the discriminatory acts.87

This part examines four

threat to plaintiff of future harm is "merely conjectural and hypothetical" and
collecting cases); Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 97 Civ. 7034, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4915 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing
because he did not show that he would use the defendant's services in the future);
Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that hearingimpaired patient did not have standing to sue a mental health clinic that refused to
provide her with a sign language interpreter because she sought counseling services
elsewhere); DeLil v. El Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94-3900, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22788 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1997) (holding that one visit to non-wheelchair accessible
restaurant in four years was not enough to give plaintiff standing); Hoepfl v. Barlow,
906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that HIV-positive plaintiff did not have
standing to sue a surgeon who refused to treat her because she had received the
needed treatment from another surgeon). But see Parr v. Waianae L & L, Inc., Civil
No. 97-01177, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7373, at *39-46 (D. Haw. May 16, 2000) (holding
that plaintiff's intent to return to a restaurant satisfied part one of the Lujan test).
Therefore, these courts either end the Lujan analysis with part one of the Lujan test,
see, e.g., Bravin, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *10-12, or state that only part one of
the Lujan test is at issue, see, e.g., Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1333
(N.D. Cal. 1994). But see Hoepfl, 906 F. Supp. at 321 (suggesting that the Lyons
analysis might logically fall under part two of the Lujan test, i.e., redressability).
84. Colker, supra note 7, at 377.
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1997)
(affirming district court's determination that defendant's no-animals policy violated
the ADA and not addressing plaintiff's standing), Leiken v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp.,
Nos. CIV. S-93-505 and CIV. S-93-1622 (renumbered No. CIV. S-93-505), 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21281, at *28 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 1994) (holding that defendant's
categorical exclusion of all persons using wheelchairs from certain facilities violated
the ADA because it resulted from "speculation, stereotypes, and generalizations," not
addressing plaintiff's standing); Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp.
342, 345 (D. Az. 1992) (finding that defendant's "absolute ban" on wheelchair-bound
base coaches violated the ADA without addressing plaintiff's standing); see also Amy
F. Robertson, Standing to Sue Under Title III of the ADA, Colo. Law., Mar. 1998, at
51, 51 (observing that "standing is raised only rarely in Title III cases" and collecting

cases).
86. One exception is the District of Hawaii, which has done a Lyons and Lujan
analysis and yet found for plaintiff. See Parr,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7373.
87. An exception to this rule is a case where the defendant's actions were an
aberration-a single violation by an unauthorized employee, for example-and were
not likely to happen again. See O'Brien v. Werner Bus Lines, No. 94-6862, 1996 U.S.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

representative cases-one in which the plaintiff experienced
discrimination once, one in which the plaintiff experienced
discrimination a few times, one in which the plaintiff experienced
discrimination many times, and one in which the court discussed
standing under the ADA in an unusually lucid manner. In each case,
the courts performed a Lyons/Lujan analysis and uniformly found
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
A wheelchair lift with no one to operate it caused a wheelchairbound plaintiff to sue in DeLil v. El Torito Restaurants.8 In this case,
plaintiff entered the restaurant on one occasion, but was unable to use
the wheelchair lift that led to the dining area without first searching
for the manager, the only person who kept a key to the lift.89
However, because plaintiff visited the restaurant only once in four
years, 90 and because she lived and worked one hundred miles from the
restaurant, 91 the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on
the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing. 92 Even though plaintiff did
re-enter the restaurant four years after the original incident-an act
the court rejected as "[a] patently.., belated effort to bolster her
standing to assert injunctive relief"-and made "numerous
declarations... [that] attempt[ed] to show that the discrimination she
allegedly experienced.., was pervasive and continuing," she did not
show that she was likely to return. 93 Therefore, the court said, plaintiff
faced only a minimal risk of discrimination in the future. 94
Dist. LEXIS 2119 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1996).
88. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788. The courts in Freydel v. New York Hospital and
Aikins v. St. Helena Hospital, cases in which defendant hospitals on a single occasion
denied deaf individuals a sign-language interpreter, also found that the plaintiffs did
not demonstrate a real and immediate threat of future injury sufficient to satisfy the
Lyons requirements. Freydel v. N.Y. Hosp., No. 97 Civ. 7926, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9, at *2-4, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2000), affd, No. 00-7108, U.S. App. LEXIS 31862 (2d
Cir. Dec. 13, 2000); Aikins, 843 F. Supp. at 1332, 1333-34. For other "one-time-only"
Title III cases that discuss standing, see Deck, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (D. Haw. 2000)
(finding that plaintiff's desire to take another cruise, which was conditioned upon her
mother's health and her own financial situation, was insufficient to confer standing);
Adelman v. Acme Mkts., No. 95-4037, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4152, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 2, 1996) (noting that pro se plaintiff who had requested compensatory and
punitive damages, which are not available under Title III of the ADA, lacked
standing because he had not alleged an intent to return to the defendant store; but
dismissing without prejudice to allow plaintiff to bring an appropriate claim for
injunctive relief); Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1573-74
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (determining that plaintiff, after facing discrimination at defendant
clinic and seeking treatment elsewhere, lacked standing because she failed to allege
that she would seek defendant's services in the future).
89. DeLil v. El Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94-3900, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. June 23,1997).
90. Id. at*12.
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at *14-15.
93. Id. at *4, 15. The content of these declarations, and the identities of the
person(s) who gave them, are not mentioned in the opinion.
94. Id. at *15.
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In Naiman v. New York University,95 a hearing-impaired plaintiff

was a patient at defendant hospital four times in three years. 96 During
each visit, plaintiff requested a sign language interpreter,

but

defendant did not provide an interpreter, or did not provide an
interpreter "in a timely manner," or provided a person with minimal
sign language ability who could not help plaintiff communicate with
his doctors or with hospital staff.97 Despite the court's finding that
plaintiff's four visits were "sufficient, for pleading purposes, to
demonstrate that, if [plaintiff] were to go to [the hospital] again, it
would again fail to provide him with effective communication,"
plaintiff did not satisfy his "burden to demonstrate standing."98 To
establish standing, the court noted, plaintiff would need to show a
"'real or immediate threat' that he will require the services of [the
hospital] in the future." 99 The court suggested that a recurring
medical condition or the proximity of the hospital to plaintiff's home
or workplace would satisfy the "real or immediate threat"
requirement. 1°°
Similarly, in Bravin v. Mount Sinai Medical Center,01 a deaf man
who communicated through sign language attended Lamaze classes
with his wife at defendant hospital before the birth of their baby. 0 2
Plaintiff requested a sign language interpreter so that he could
95. No. 95 Civ. 6469, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1997). A
related case is Schroedel v. New York University Medical Center, in which defendant

failed to provide a hearing-impaired plaintiff with a sign-language interpreter, but
plaintiff was found to lack standing because defendant hospital was not the nearest
medical center to either plaintiff's residence or her workplace, and plaintiff had used
the hospital only three times in sixteen years. 885 F. Supp. 594, 596, 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). Therefore, plaintiff had "not established a real and immediate threat of
repeated injury sufficient to confer standing for injunctive relief." Id. at 599. The
cases are related in that the plaintiff in Naiman sought to intervene as a class plaintiff
in Schroedel. Naiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at *8. The court denied the
Naiman plaintiff's motion to intervene on the grounds that he lacked standing. Id. at
*9-10.
96. Naiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at *1. Each visit at issue occurred after
1990, the year in which the ADA was enacted. Id.
97. Id. at *2-3 (internal quotations omitted).
98. Id. at *14.
99. Id.

100. Id. at *14 & n.4. The court did grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint,
and even offered some hints as to what allegations might be sufficient to establish
standing. See id.

101. No. 97 Civ. 7034, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999).
Another Title III case with similar facts is Davis v. Flexman, in which the court
dismissed plaintiff's claims against a clinic for lack of standing even though plaintiff
had been denied a sign-language interpreter during six months of psychological
counseling. 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780-81, 784 (S.D. Ohio 1999). Plaintiff had begun
meeting with her counselor outside the clinic, and told the counselor that she did not
want to schedule any more meetings at the clinic. Id. at 781. The court found,
therefore, that plaintiff did not face "a real and immediate threat of future
discrimination." Id. at 784.
102. Bravin, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *4-5.
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understand the classes, but the hospital denied the service because
plaintiff was not a "patient."'' 3 Immediately after the baby's birth at
the hospital, the hospital transferred the baby to its neo-natal
intensive care unit."°
Plaintiff again requested an interpreter
following the transfer, but the hospital again denied him
interpretation services.""
Even though the court observed that plaintiff's complaint was
"sufficient, for pleading purposes, to demonstrate that if the
[plaintiffs] were to go to [the hospital] again, it would fail to provide
[plaintiff] with effective communication,"''0 6 the risk of future
discrimination was not enough: "The [plaintiffs] must show that there
is a likelihood that they will require the services of [the hospital] in the
near future.' 0 7 Yet, despite the holding of no standing under Title III
of the ADA, the court found defendant liable for its failure to provide
an interpreter for the Lamaze classes, and granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment on that issue." 8 In response to defendant's
argument that the plaintiff in this case was not entitled to
accommodation for the Lamaze classes, the court remarked as
follows:
While [the hospital] is undoubtedly correct that [plaintiff] could not
attend the classes by himself, neither could [plaintiff's wife] attend
the classes by herself. She was required to have a "birthing
partner," and, like many, if not most women in her position, she
chose her husband. Accordingly, it would appear that in order to
allow [plaintiff] to participate in and benefit from the service being
provided, [the hospital] was required to make some reasonable
accommodation for [plaintiff]. 9
However, because the ADA does not provide for damages for
individual plaintiffs,"0 the court's finding that defendant failed to
meet the ADA standard for public accommodations but that plaintiff
could not bring a claim for injunctive relief for lack of standing, is not
particularly helpful in the ADA context. 1
103. Id. at *5. Defendant did "agree to provide an interpreter for the birth
process." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *5-6. Three days after his request was denied, plaintiff moved, by order
to show cause, for a preliminary injunction requiring the hospital to provide an
interpreter. The hospital then agreed to provide an interpreter. Id. at *3-4.
106. Id. at *12-13.
107. Id. at *13. However, the court went so far as to call the hospital's actions a
"policy," id. at *12, and granted plaintiff leave to replead. Id. at *20.
108. Id. at *38-39. The question before the court on this issue was "whether
[plaintiff] was entitled to a qualified interpreter as a matter of law," the law being the
ADA. Id. at *29. In effect, the court acknowledged that defendant had violated the
ADA, but denied relief because plaintiff lacked standing.
109. Id. at *33.
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a) (1994).
111. Plaintiff did bring claims for damages under the predecessor to the ADA, the
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The HIV-positive plaintiff in Hoepfl v. Barlow 1 2 spent more than
six months seeking a doctor to remove ruptured breast implants." 3
When plaintiff finally found a doctor, she disclosed her HIV-positive
status, to which the doctor replied "he would 'not touch an HIV
patient with a ten-foot pole."" 14 Although the doctor made a belated
effort to console the plaintiff by offering to perform the surgery if no
one else would, 15 plaintiff did find another doctor and the surgery was
performed about four months after the unfortunate consultation with
defendant.116
By the time the case reached the court, plaintiff had moved to a
different state. 17 That move, along with plaintiff's having received the
needed surgery,"8 laid the foundation for the court's dismissal of the
case for lack of standing."9 The court noted, "a plaintiff must show
that her injury is both 'real and immediate' to establish the 'personal
stake in the outcome' necessary for the proper resolution of important
federal questions. 1 2 ' Furthermore, according 2to the court, "an
injunction cannot remedy [plaintiff's] past injury.' '
Hoepfl is an important case because it is one of the few instances
where a court discusses in detail some of the arguments for and
against standing in the ADA Title III context. First, the court
rejected plaintiff's argument that standing is automatically established
if Congress has authorized injunctive relief by statute. 2 The court
stated, "[h]er argument improperly equates a grant of standing to seek
injunctive relief to qualified ADA plaintiffs with a blanket grant to all
plaintiffs who can allege a past ADA discrimination.' 23 Second, in
response to the plaintiff's argument that private suits for injunctive
relief are the only means by which the purposes of the ADA could be
fulfilled, the court said, "[n]othing in the ADA or its legislative history
suggests an intent to allow individuals, in clear derogation of the
Lyons principles, to obtain injunctions on the basis of past
wrongdoing alone.' a24 An argument to the contrary, according to the
Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999 & Supp. 2002); Bravin, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4915, at *1. Therefore, establishing defendant's liability may have been useful
to the plaintiff in his claim for damages.
112. 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1995).
113. Id. at 318.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 319.
117. Id. at 318.
118. Id. at 322 ("It is difficult at best to see how an injunction directed to
[defendant] in his Virginia office would be of any benefit to [plaintiff] in North
Carolina who no longer needs his services.").
119. Id. at 322-23.
120. Id. at 321.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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court, would be an argument "that the common law rules on standing
should not apply in ADA cases." ' 25

Third, the Hoepfl court addressed the language of the ADA, and
embraced the view that, even if Congress had the authority to expand
standing radically, Congress chose not to exercise that authority. 126
For the court, the phrase "is being subjected to discrimination"1 27 was
dispositive. The use of the progressive verb indicated continuing,
ongoing action, and therefore "reflect[ed] Congress's intent that the
ADA not be used as a vehicle for private plaintiffs'128 to obtain
injunctive relief on the basis of past discrimination alone.
Finally, the court pointed to the provisions of the ADA that give
enforcement powers to the United States Attorney General in support
of its view that private plaintiffs who do not suffer from ongoing and29
future discrimination do not have standing to bring an ADA claim.
This opportunity for "lawsuit[s] on behalf of the public good" refers to
discrimination that occurred in the past, 30 and thereby offers a
remedy for plaintiffs who cannot allege ongoing discrimination."'
Although a plaintiff like Hoepfl "may reasonably regard this avenue
of relief as impractical or unrealistic for obvious reasons," the court
nevertheless called the Attorney General provision "an appropriate
'3 2
avenue and the one Congress chose to enact.'
All of the plaintiffs in these cases experienced discrimination on the
basis of their disabilities. All of the courts recognized that plaintiffs
had suffered injury, and, most important, all of the courts admitted
that defendants had violated the ADA. The strict interpretation of
Lujan and Lyons to which the courts adhered, however, rendered the
plaintiffs' claims useless, because none of the plaintiffs could
demonstrate the necessary intent to return (Lujan) that would
establish an imminent threat of future harm (Lyons) and, therefore,
standing. Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not seek monetary
damages, as the ADA allows monetary damages only where the
Attorney General brings a suit on a plaintiff's behalf.133 The plaintiffs,
therefore, were left without any practical remedy, and the defendants
were given free rein to continue their discriminatory practices.
Part III demonstrates why this narrow view of standing doctrine is
inappropriate in the ADA context. It argues that strict, formalistic
application of Lujan and Lyons is not uniformly appropriate in the
125. Id.
126. Id. at 323.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1) (1994).
128. Hoepfl, 906 F. Supp. at 323.
129. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(b)(1)(B); see also supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the Attorney General provisions of the ADA).
130. Hoepfl, 906 F. Supp. at 324.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)-(b).
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ADA Title III cases; it addresses Congress's ability to grant standing
through statutory enactment, and Congress's intent to do so in the
ADA. Next, it examines the common-sense arguments in favor of
broader standing for ADA plaintiffs.
Part III then offers a suggestion-a workable standard that may
solve some of the issues that arise in applying standing doctrine to the
ADA. This standard retains the principles of current Article III
jurisprudence, but shifts the focus of the analysis to congressional
intent and common-sense outcomes.
Part III then applies the
workable standard to the cases outlined above,"' and suggests
different outcomes for some of the cases.
III. TAKING A STAND: ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES AND A NEW
STANDARD FOR STANDING

Most district courts that have ruled on standing in the ADA context
have adhered to a strict interpretation of standing doctrine,135 and this
approach is not entirely unreasonable. The cases or controversies
requirement comes straight from the Constitution,'3 6 Lujan is the law
insofar as it is the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the
requirements of standing,137 and Lyons fleshes out those requirements
for standing when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.'38 Even within
this jurisprudential framework, however, the doctrine of standing does
not necessarily bar ADA Title III claims. This section offers some
alternative arguments in favor of standing in the context of the ADA.
A. Fresh Alternatives
1. Article III, Lujan and Lyons
Article III requires "cases or controversies," but does not define
those terms. Furthermore, as we have seen, standing doctrine is a
twentieth-century phenomenon that would have been a foreign
concept in the eighteenth century.'39 Nowhere in the Constitution do
we find a three-part test for standing, or a requirement of future injury
to establish that a plaintiff has a case or controversy. Lujan and
Lyons, therefore, need not be the last word on standing doctrine.
Indeed, the intense criticism that these cases brought about suggests a
need for a more flexible interpretation of Article 11I . 4
Even
assuming that Lujan and Lyons are unassailable interpretations of
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1983).
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 27; Sunstein, supra note 30.
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Article III, those opinions themselves reveal subtleties that undercut

their applicability to the ADA.
First, Lujan contains more nuances than the district court opinions
suggest, and "strict" adherence to the language of the opinion may
actually allow for some flexibility in the ADA context. As noted
above, Lujan does not foreclose the possibility of statutory grants of
standing.1

4

'

Rather, Lujan offers a more flexible approach if there is

an express congressional grant of standing when a plaintiff has
actually suffered an injury under such a grant.142 As a statute that
elevates disability discrimination to a legally cognizable level, the
ADA is a good candidate for this broad reading of Lujan.
A second rationale for a more flexible interpretation of Lujan is
that Title III of the ADA applies only to private actors. In contrast,

the Lujan Court focused on suits against the government and
explicitly addressed standing in that context.1 4' The language of the
Lujan opinion speaks particularly to suits against government

agencies, and thus leaves open the possibility that requirements for
standing might differ in different contexts. 44
Moreover, the federalism issues that are present in Lujan are absent
in ADA Title III cases. While the Lujan Court feared usurpation of

executive authority by Congress's converting generalized interests

into individual rights, 145 both of those fears are absent in ADA cases.
First, the ADA does not "convert the undifferentiated public

interest"' 46 into individual rights, but rather "elevat[es] to the status of
legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were

previously inadequate [not legally punishable] in law," 147 because only

those who are personally subjected to discrimination may sue under
Title III of the ADA.1 48 Second, Title III plaintiffs sue private
parties, 49 not government actors, so the cases do not present the
separation of powers issues that were present in Lujan.5 °

141. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
142. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
143. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
144. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 ("[I]t is clear that in suits against the Government, at
least, the concrete injury requirement myst remain." (emphasis added)).
145. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
146. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
147. Id. at 578.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1) (1994).
149. Title III of the ADA is applicable only to public accommodations, which are
defined as private entities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181(7), 12,182(a).
150. As Sunstein observes, "a large part of the Court's opinion [in Lujan] relies on
the fear that, without a particularized injury, courts will be displacing executive
power ....This concern is entirely inapplicable when the executive is not even a
party." Sunstein, supra note 30, at 231; see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text;
see also Cass, supra note 27, at 318 ("Who may obtain review of agency action
generally is referred to as a question of 'standing."' (emphasis added)).
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In addition, one can distinguish the Lujan plaintiff, who had not yet
suffered an injury, from ADA plaintiffs, who have suffered injuries.
The Lujan plaintiffs had not experienced illegal conduct, having
visited the affected habitats before the commencement of the
government projects at issue.15' Therefore, the plaintiffs' non-specific,
"some day" intent to return was not enough to establish the requisite
injury. 1 2 ADA plaintiffs, in contrast, have suffered discrimination.'53
Thus, strict application of Lujan, without consideration of the injury
that an ADA plaintiff has already experienced, may misconstrue the

Court's opinion.
Even if Lujan does apply to suits brought under a statutory grant of
standing, the injury-in-fact test may produce absurd results in ADA
cases. As Professor Cass Sunstein notes, "[b]efore Lujan, requiring

people to obtain a plane ticket or to make firm plans to visit the
habitat of endangered species might well have been unnecessarily
formalistic.
Now such actions are apparently required."'5 4

Commentators have not overlooked the triviality of this holding.'55 In
the ADA context, a strict requirement of concrete plans to visit an
establishment does not take into account Congress's findings that,
because of the prevalence of disability discrimination, individuals with
disabilities are less likely to make use of such services in the first
place. 56 Furthermore, the amount of planning required should vary
from one public accommodation to the next: The plans one makes to
travel on a cruise line are quite different from the plans one makes to
visit the emergency room.'57
Lyons is another governing Supreme Court decision on the issue of
standing when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.15 Because injunctive

151. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. Although the Court refers to "'past exposure to
illegal conduct,"' id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)),
one could argue that the Lujan plaintiffs had not been exposed to past illegal conduct
at all, because their visits had occurred before the government action had begun.
152. See id.
153. Courts that analyze a Title III plaintiff's standing almost always find that
plaintiff has suffered an injury. See supra Part II. Also, one must recall that the ADA
offers only injunctive relief for private plaintiffs-no monetary relief is available
unless plaintiff can persuade the Attorney General to pursue the claim on plaintiff's
behalf. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1).
Therefore, an ADA plaintiff who fails the
Lyons/Lujan test will often go without any remedy.
154. See Sunstein, suprq note 30, at 226-27.
155. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 1177. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion,
also found the airline ticket requirement "trivial." See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a). Persons with disabilities are therefore less likely to
establish those patterns of using services which help establish intent to return and,
hence, standing.
157. Cf.Parr v. Waianae L & L, Inc., Civil No. 97-01177, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7373, at *41 (D. Haw. May 16, 2000) (considering the need for advance planning in
evaluating plaintiff's standing).
158. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-05 (1983); see also Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560 (citing Lyons with approval).
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relief is the only relief afforded to private plaintiffs under Title III of
the ADA,159 district courts deciding ADA Title III cases reach for
Lyons as a logical focus for determinations of standing. The courts
that interpret Lyons in the ADA context, however, overlook the fact
that the plaintiff in Lyons would have had to allege future criminal
activity in order to establish a threat of future harm. 6 ° The Lyons
Court, on the other hand, paid much attention to this fact. 161
The applicability of Lyons in the ADA context is, therefore,
problematic. As one commentator notes,
Courts that have applied Lyons to ADA Title III cases have applied
the doctrine too stringently and have arguably misconstrued the
nature of these Title III actions. ADA Title III cases do not involve
extreme situations in which only a plaintiff's criminal conduct could
cause future discrimination to occur. Instead, these are cases in
which plaintiffs represent a class of litigants who repeatedly face

instances 62of discrimination as a result of their own... lawful
conduct.1
In fact, in a pre-ADA case, the Supreme Court distinguished the
Lyons principles from situations in which a plaintiff faces future
discrimination on the basis of disability.'63
Another area in which courts might exercise some flexibility while
remaining faithful to the Lyons and Lujan analyses is the use of an
exception to the mootness doctrine: a claim may be capable of
repetition but evade review. 64 The most familiar example of the
Supreme Court's use of this exception is Roe v. Wade.65 In that case,
the Court noted that a "pregnancy will come to term before the usual
appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot,
pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage,
and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be
that rigid.' 66 Likewise, strict construction of an intent-to-return test
unnecessarily limits ADA plaintiffs' chances of having their cases

159. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
160. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06.
161. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. The Court filled about ten
pages of a sixteen-page opinion with a discussion of the threat of future injury in the
context of future criminal activity. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-11.
162. Colker, supra note 7, at 397.
163. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320-22 (1988) (upholding lower court's
injunction that prevented a school district from unilaterally expelling an emotionally
disturbed (and therefore disabled within the meaning of the Education of the
Handicapped Act) student; finding that the case was not moot because the student
could not control his behavior and, therefore, was reasonably likely to be subjected to
another unilateral attempt at expulsion); Colker, supra note 7, at 397-98 (describing
Honig).

164. Colker, supra note 7, at 396.
165. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166. Id. at 125.
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heard before a court. If bearing children is capable of repetition,'67
then filling cavities 168 and going to the emergency room 169 also ought

to be encompassed by the exception and a more liberal administration
of the intent-to-return test should prevail.
2. Congressional Intent, Cases and Controversies, and the Plain
Language of the ADA

Courts that have found that a plaintiff does not have standing to sue
under Title III of the ADA have used more than Lujan and Lyons to
support their holdings.

Some courts have questioned Congress's

ability to grant standing through statutory enactment. 7 ° Others have
observed that, even if Congress had such ability, the ADA's legislative
history might undo the congressional grant.' 7' Finally, the language

and structure of the ADA have been used against it as evidence that
exercise any powers that it might have to grant
Congress did not
72
broad standing.

Commentators, however, have roundly attacked the first of these
arguments and urge that an express congressional grant creates

standing.'73 These commentators focus on the "key question":
"whether Congress (or some other relevant source of law) has created

a cause of action. Without a cause of action, there is no standing;

there is no case or controversy; and courts are without authority to
hear the case under Article III."'7

Furthermore, even the Lujan

opinion does not expressly limit Congress's power to grant standing to
167. Such a change might necessitate a different holding in Bravin v. Mt. Sinai
Medical Center, No. 97 Civ. 7034, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
1999), which held that Lamaze classes and subsequent neo-natal care were not
enough to confer standing on the father, a deaf man, absent allegations that he would
return to the hospital in the future.
168. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998). The plaintiff in Bragdon
apparently did not have her cavity filled before the case moved through the appellate
process. See Colker, supra note 7, at 398 n.114. In any event, because the Supreme
Court could have raised the issue of standing sua sponte, the Court may not have
considered standing to be an issue. See supra note 15 (discussing Bragdon); see also
Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1300 (D. Haw. 2000) ("[I]t is
entirely possible that Plaintiff [in Bragdon] explicitly stated that she wanted the very
same cavity filled in the defendant's office that the defendant had refused to fill-and
the Supreme court did not mention this fact because standing obviously was not an
issue.").
169. See Naiman v. N.Y. Univ., No. 95 Civ. 6469, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6616, at
*2, 8-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1997); Schroedel v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp.
594, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
170. See supra notes 79-81, 122-23 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text; cf Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-72 (2001) (using legislative history to limit the
ADA's applicability to states).
172. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
173. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 166; Nichol, supra note 48, at 1157, 1160-62.
174. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 222.
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persons who suffer concrete injuries under a federal statute175 and who
bring suit against private actors.'7 6 Thus, a congressional grant of
standing should satisfy the requirements of Article III.
In fact, the language of the ADA lends support to the view that
Congress did intend to create a broad grant of standing. Specifically,
the notions that "any person who is being subjected to discrimination"
has an ADA remedy,'77 and that "[n]othing... shall require... a

futile gesture" on the part of a person who knows that a public
accommodation will discriminate against him or her'78 indicate
Congress's intent to give broad standing to plaintiffs.'
The
provisions for injunctive relief as the sole ADA remedy for private
plaintiffs 80 support this broad reading of the statute. While plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief normally must allege an ongoing threat of
injury, the "no futile gesture" language coupled with the limited
means of relief available to plaintiffs indicate less restrictive
requirements for standing.'

175. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. The language "is being subjected to discrimination," 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1)
(emphasis added), has caused at least one court to dismiss a case for lack of standing.
See Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 323 (E.D. Va. 1995). The phrase, the court
said, indicates current, ongoing action. See id. at 323.
However, just one
discriminatory act has "continuing,. .. adverse effects," City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983), to the extent that a single act limits a disabled person's ability
to choose the public accommodations he or she will frequent. See Colker, supra note
7, at 398 ("[T]he right to choose [a personal service provider] is reinforced in the
ADA.... To preserve that right, an injunction is absolutely essential as a remedy.").
Commentators have also criticized courts' tendencies to equate "plain language" with
narrow interpretation in the ADA context:
Despite judicial claims that the courts are simply applying the 'plain
meaning' of the statute, the courts are choosing narrow readings over broad
ones, even in the face of expansive administrative interpretation and strong
evidence that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted broadly. ...
But the text [of the ADA] does not mandate the narrow approach that the
courts have taken.
Diller, supra note 7, at 21.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a)(1) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1994), which
allows injunctive relief as the exclusive remedy for private causes of action). The
usefulness of this limited avenue of relief in the ADA context, as opposed to the Civil
Rights Act context, is debatable: "The threat of injunctive relief is not sufficient to
create compliance, because compliance requires a more proactive step than merely
removing a 'whites only' sign and may entail what is perceived to be a significant
expense." Colker, supra note 7, at 395. When courts further limit the avenues of relief
by imposing strict standing requirements, defendants' incentives for compliance are
further reduced. See Colker, supra note 7, at 379-80, 394-95.
181. Indeed, this view countenances a "derogation of the Lyons principles" which
some courts have avoided. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Such
"derogation, " however, might be perfectly appropriate, as the applicability of Lyons
in the ADA context is problematic. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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The intent of Congress to grant broad standing dovetails with the
goals of the ADA. The point of the Act, as expressed in the
legislative findings and statements of purpose, is to bring to an end the
"unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice [that] denies
people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis
and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is
justifiably famous. 18 2 However, courts that take a strict view of
standing frustrate this goal, especially in those cases where a court
acknowledges ongoing discrimination that would likely recur should
the plaintiff again visit the public accommodation, but nevertheless
finds a lack of standing for failure to state explicitly an intent to return
to the public accommodation.'8 3
3. Absurd Results and a Dose of Common Sense
In addition, common sense may support more liberal standing
requirements for ADA plaintiffs. To begin with, requiring likely
return in order for a plaintiff to have standing "allow[s] an alleged
wrongdoer to evade the court's jurisdiction so long as he does not
'
This requirement therefore weakens
injure the same person twice."184
the ADA, allows unlawful conduct, and frees defendants from
accountability."8 5 In effect, the hardest, most crabbed discriminators
would take a free ride: If the discrimination81 6were bad enough, what
potential plaintiff would ever wish to return?'
In addition, demanding a likelihood of return in order to establish
the injury requisite for injunctive relief eviscerates the ADA and
undermines its goals. As one author observed, "[i]n the context of
personal services, it is unlikely that anyone would engage the services
of a provider again after the provider had engaged in blatant
discrimination, since other providers are usually available."' 8 7 To
require a plaintiff to allege that he or she would return to the
discriminatory establishment in order to have standing, therefore,
"makes no sense."' 188
The author also appealed to the power of the courts:
If a court has the power to require affirmative action-which
benefits individuals in the future who were not a party to the original
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994).

183. See, e.g., Bravin v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., No. Civ. 7034, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4915, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,1999).
184. Parr v. Waianae L & L, Inc., Civil No. 97-01177, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7373,
at *43 (D. Haw. May 16, 2000) (quoting Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F.
Supp. 698, 762 (D. Or. 1997)).
185. Id. at *43-44.
186. This incentive to make any discrimination egregious further weakens the
ADA's already weak incentives for Title III compliance. See supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
187. Colker, supra note 7, at 398.
188. Id.
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litigation-it is hard to see how a court does not have the power to
grant injunctive relief to a named plaintiff who theoretically could
seek to use the service she was denied in the future.'89
Furthermore, persons with disabilities may find themselves in a
double bind, as they are less likely to have made use of public
accommodations in the past and therefore cannot establish patterns of
use that would demonstrate an intent to return to a given public
accommodation.19 Finally, to require a plaintiff to organize his or her
life around the standing issue-by waiting to get a cavity filled or
continuing to seek pediatric care at the hospital that would not
provide accommodations during pregnancy and time spent in the neonatal unit, for example' 9'- makes the ADA's coverage of personal
services largely ineffective and thereby undermines all congressional
aims.'9'
Indeed, many countervailing arguments in favor of broad
standing-arguments of formalism, intent, applicability, and common
sense-present themselves to courts deciding issues of standing in the
ADA Title III context. Thus, the manner in which many district
courts have handled Title III cases is, perhaps not surprisingly,
awkward at best and blatantly unfair at worst. The next section,
therefore, suggests a solution to the problems of standing in the ADA
context: a middle ground that accounts for factors on both sides of
the standing arguments.
B. Proposal
The near-impossible hurdles that courts create for ADA plaintiffs
both frustrate congressional intent and leave ADA plaintiffs without
any practical remedy-a sadly ironic result in light of the high-flown

189. Id. at 399. Denial of injunctive relief on the basis of standing, therefore,
undermines congressional purpose and intent. Id. Colker also notes that class actions
are difficult to maintain under the ADA, because different discriminatory practices
may affect different types of disabilities. Id. at 379 n.19.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994) (finding discrimination in access to public
services); 134 Cong. Rec. S5197-08 (1988) (noting that, as late as 1988, a zookeeper
"refused to admit children with Down's Syndrome because he feared they would
upset the chimpanzees").
191. This may be more than mere example: the plaintiff in Bragdon apparently did
not have the cavity filled in order to preserve her standing to seek an injunction. See
Colker, supra note 7, at 398 n.114.
192. Id. at 398. Again comparing the ADA with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Colker concludes
"[t]his kind of problem rarely arose under CRA Title II, because plaintiffs in
those cases were likely to want to return to the restaurant or hotel in
question (or at least could claim they had an interest in returning). Since
CRA Title II does not cover personal service situations, it does not cover
Bragdon-like fact patterns."
Id. at 399.
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rhetoric that accompanied the passage of the ADA. 93 These
holdings, however, are not inevitable. This Note advocates a bettertempered interpretation of standing doctrine in the ADA Title III
context that advances Congress's goals.
1. A Workable Standard for Standing
Courts need not discard Lyons and Lujan when deciding issues of
standing. Even though the applicability of these cases in the ADA
context is not entirely clear,194 Lyons and Lujan do help make easy
work of the easy cases, in which the defendant's discriminatory
behavior is anomalous or in which the defendant changes a
discriminatory policy in light of the discriminatory treatment toward
the plaintiff.'95 In these cases, the goal of Title III of the ADA-to
end disability discrimination in public accommodations-is met
without the courts' intervention. Therefore, neither injunctive relief
nor standing in general is necessary to fulfill congressional intent.
However, courts should keep this concern for congressional intent
in mind whenever they apply the Lyons and Lujan standards. Instead
of applying a strict approach to the requirement of real and imminent
future harm,'96 which focuses mainly on plaintiff's future conduct,'97
courts should focus on defendant's conduct and the likelihood that,
were plaintiff to return, he or she would again face discrimination.
The actual likelihood of plaintiff's return to the public
accommodation, therefore, should play a secondary role in the
standing analysis, and should vary with the circumstances. For this
second part of the standard, courts should consider the plaintiff's
relationship with the defendant, and to this end should take into
account the type of relationship, the length of the relationship, and the
frequency of plaintiff's visits to the public accommodation. 198 Next,
courts should consider the nature of the public accommodation itself
and assess the likelihood of return based on normal usage patterns for
that type of public accommodation.199 This accords with Article III's

193. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
194. See supra Part 1II.A.1.
195. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
196. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
197. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
198. Thus, for example, plaintiffs who seek relief from discriminatory health care
services would have a better chance at acquiring an injunction when the relationship
with the health care provider has gone on for some time. Of course, courts should
also consider the possibility that a plaintiff, because of her disability, may not have
had the opportunity to establish a long-term relationship with a particular public
accommodation. See supra note 194.
199. Such normal usage patterns would include the frequency with which
individuals normally visit the public accommodation, and the amount of preparation
and advance planning required to visit such accommodation.
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requirement of a case or controversy, and plaintiff surely has a case
against a defendant who has engaged in discrimination.
This assessment of the standing issue in ADA cases advances the
goals of the ADA by removing from plaintiff's shoulders the burden
of proving, at the pleading stage, something that may be impossible to
prove: plaintiff's intent to return to an establishment that had
discriminated against plaintiff in the past. 0° Instead, the assessment
allows courts to consider plaintiff's likelihood of return under a given
set of circumstances, and to allow those standards to inform the
determination of the standing issue.2"1 Establishing such a likelihood
of return, in many ADA cases, is justified. This is especially so in
those cases where the courts have not questioned the existence of
defendant's discriminatory practice, but have nevertheless found that
a plaintiff lacks standing because the plaintiff did not show an intent
to return. More importantly, shifting the focus to defendant's
conduct, both before and after the alleged discriminatory activity,
ensures that only those cases where an injunction would, in fact,
provide relief go forward. The next section demonstrates the use of
the tempered intent-to-return test in several factual scenarios.
2. The Workable Standard for Standing: Application
The workable standard for standing would not significantly alter the
outcomes of those ADA cases in which defendant's behavior was a
single aberration or in which the defendant changed its
antidiscrimination policies or otherwise demonstrated that the
discrimination plaintiff suffered would not happen again. °2 In those
situations, application of the first part of the standard would preclude
further inquiry. Defendant's anomalous (or changed) behavior would
render an injunction useless, as there would be no likelihood that
defendant would discriminate against plaintiff in the future. The
likelihood of plaintiff's return would, therefore, be an unnecessary
inquiry, as plaintiff's aims-and the aims of the ADA-would be met.
The "borderline" cases-those in which plaintiff had experienced
discrimination only a few times and in which defendant had not

200. In fact, the intent-to-return test, when strictly applied, may have perverse
results. Those accommodations to which plaintiffs would reasonably want to return
are likely those accommodations which have discriminated in a minimal way.
However, plaintiffs are much less likely to want to return to those places that have
engaged in egregious discrimination. Therefore, under a strict intent-to-return
regime, those places with minor infractions might be more likely to face a federal
injunction than those places practicing blatant discrimination.
201. The distinction between intent to return and likelihood of return may seem
overly fine, but are the courts not drawing similar distinctions when they base a
holding of no standing on plaintiff's purchase of airline tickets? See supra notes 71-72
and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 87.
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changed discriminatory policies 2° 3-would present some perplexities
under the workable standard for ADA standing, but such challenges
could be overcome by careful application of the standard to the facts
of the case. Because the borderline cases present defendants who do
not attempt to change allegedly discriminatory policies, there is a
likelihood that plaintiff would suffer harm at the hands of the
defendant, were the plaintiff to return to the establishment. The next
step in the analysis, therefore, would be to assess the likelihood of
return based on the past relationship between plaintiff and defendant.
This is the problematic issue, because a defendant would argue that a
plaintiff "just passing through" or a plaintiff who has never before
visited the public accommodation lacks the sort of relationship with
defendant that could bolster an argument for standing.
However, even in those cases where there is a "just passing
through" relationship, or where a plaintiff is not "passing through"
but had not established a pattern of use with the public
accommodation,2" a court should still consider the nature of the
public accommodation before concluding that plaintiff lacks standing.
In those instances where infrequent visits would be the norm, such as
use of an emergency room, plaintiff's claim to have standing should
not fail. In addition, for those public accommodations that are
"destinations" in themselves (cruises, resorts, fine restaurants), courts
should not conclude that plaintiff lacks standing merely because
plaintiff had only visited the accommodation once.
Courts deciding cases with more egregious facts, such as those
where plaintiff had experienced discrimination many times at the
same public accommodation,2 °5 may also use the workable standardin fact, the analysis in these cases is relatively simple. The "egregious"
defendants have not altered their discriminatory policies, so the first
part of the standard poses no problems. The second part-the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant-is likewise easily
resolved, as plaintiffs in these cases have established long-term
relationships with defendant organizations despite the discriminatory
treatment plaintiffs have suffered. Because these cases arise most
frequently in the health care context, the likelihood of return once a
relationship has been established is, for the most part, great. A court,
therefore, need not consider the nature of the establishment, as
plaintiff would have established a likelihood of return and, therefore,
would have established standing.

203. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The public accommodations provisions of the ADA play an
important role in furthering the goals of the statute: to eliminate the
pervasive social problem of disability discrimination. By making sure
that individuals with disabilities have equal access to professional
services, personal services, private transportation services, lodging,
restaurants, shops, and recreational facilities, Title III enables fuller
and more active participation in community life and greater chances
for independent living. As our society ages, these provisions become
even more important. Although Title III of the ADA has taken a
back seat to Titles I and II (the employment and public services
provisions), no one, least of all the courts, should overlook its
significance in the overall strategy of the ADA.
The broad grant of standing in Title III of the ADA should be one
of the statute's strengths, but many courts have turned that strength
into a weakness. By narrowly interpreting the Supreme Court's
standing jurisprudence, without considering the context and nuances
of the opinions, these courts have created legal barriers that deny
access to some ADA plaintiffs. These plaintiffs have great difficulties
proving that they would return to public accommodations that have
discriminated against them, especially if they have fulfilled the need
,for that service elsewhere or if they have not used the service with
frequency in the past.
A court does not need to abandon precedent, however, to achieve a
just result in deciding standing for ADA plaintiffs. The language of
Lujan and Lyons provide indications that different results might
follow in the ADA context. Courts, therefore, can focus not on a
plaintiff's intent to return to a specific public accommodation-an
evaluation that relies on a plaintiff's volitional, and completely legal,
activity-but focus on the discriminatory behavior of the defendant to
determine whether the plaintiff is at risk of future discrimination.
Rather than requiring specific intent to return, the courts should
instead consider the likelihood of plaintiff's return based on all the
circumstances. Courts may still bar cases that do not demonstrate a
threat of future injury at the hands of the defendant, as well as cases
where plaintiff's relationship with the public accommodation is simply
too tenuous to make injunctive relief appropriate. But in some cases
where relief has been denied, a shift of focus may allow a plaintiff an
otherwise unavailable remedy and therefore might better serve the
ends of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

